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Abstract
While enjoying the most rapid economic growth of all large industrialized nations, inequalities in the distribution of 
income have grown faster in the United States than in most developed nations since the late 1960s. Previous 
empirical analysis studying the effects of increasing globalization on income inequality defined “economic 
globalization” as international trade and capital flows. By excluding international labor flows from the definition of 
economic globalization, previous studies ignored an essential factor of production and assessed the effects of 
globalization on income disparities inaccurately. This study assesses the impact of increasing international 
integration on the American income gap through an empirical examination of trade, capital and labor mobility. The 
research relies on ordinary least squares regression to test the relationship between the three major modes of 
neoliberal economic integration—trade, foreign direct investment, portfolio investment—and international labor 
mobility—authorized and unauthorized immigration—on an income inequality ratio for the years 1980 to 2005. By 
expanding the definition of economic globalization to include international labor mobility, this work contributes to 
the literature on income inequality by extending the debate into the area of demographic change and the 
measurement of the unauthorized population in the United States.    
Introduction
Income inequality in the United States deserves the attention of scholars and policy makers because it has 
grown during the recent period of strong economic growth. Despite enjoying the most rapid economic growth of all 
other large industrialized countries, inequalities in the distribution of income have grown faster in the United States 
than in most developed countries since the late 1960s (Burtless, 2003). While productivity gains have been at all 
time highs recently (Burtless, 2003), the level of inequality in the U.S. has increased, which suggests American 
workers may not be reaping the benefits of this economic expansion.  As the economy has grown, increases in 
corporate profits and CEO earnings have increased exponentially as real wages for the majority of workers remain 
stagnant or fall. The income gap, therefore, suggests not only a measure of inequality but, perhaps more importantly, 
inequity in a society that has long celebrated itself as the most democratic, classless, and just in the world. During 
this period of increasing productivity and higher earnings among CEOs, the U.S. economy also became increasingly 
integrated into the world economy. Part of the purpose of this paper is to better assess the effects this increasing 
integration had on income inequality.
Graph I illustrates the development of income inequality in the United States by charting the ratio between 
the top 20 % and bottom 20 % of all income earners for the years 1947 to 2005. Although disparities in the 
distribution of income grew sharply during all eight years of Reaganomics, the most dramatic increase in inequality 
was during the Clinton administration, which advocated increasing global economic integration. In his 1999 State of 
the Union address, President Clinton (1999) asked the nation "to tear down barriers, open markets and expand 
trade." Under the current regime, global integration means trade and capital are relatively free to move across 
national borders but the mobility of labor is restricted by the state. Despite efforts to enhance border security, 
however, international migrants continue to pour into the U.S.; the economic impacts of trade, capital, and labor 
flows on income distribution remain unclear. 
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Year
Figure I. Ratio of Share of Income Earned by Top 20 Percent of Income Earners 
to Bottom 20 Percent of Income Earners, United States, 1947-2005
Source: U.S. Census Bureau
 How does the current era's economic globalization affect income distribution? What affect does 
immigration, both authorized and unauthorized, have on income inequality? Are critics correct when they charge 
that globalization is the major source of economic inequality? This study answers these questions by assessing the 
effect of economic globalization on income distribution in the United States for the years 1980 to 2005. Most 
income inequality scholars have defined economic globalization to mean the ease with which trade, foreign direct 
investment (FDI), and portfolio investments flow across international borders (Held et al. 1999; Reuveny and Li 
2003). Consequently, previous empirical studies have examined the effect that "economic openness" or "economic 
globalization" has on income inequality by focusing only on the international mobility of goods and capital 
(Reuveny and Li 2003; Rudra 2004; Mahler 2004). However, by defining economic globalization narrowly and 
excluding international labor flows—immigration—from their analyses, these studies have neglected the impact the 
size and composition of the labor supply, an essential factor in economic production processes, has on income 
distribution. This study offers an empirical examination of the impact economic globalization, comprehensively 
defined to include trade, FDI, portfolio investment, documented immigration, and undocumented immigration, has 
on an inequality ratio between the top 20% and bottom 20% of all income earners in the US. 
 The remainder of the article proceeds as follows: the first section briefly discusses the importance of 
income inequality in the U.S.; the next section reviews theoretical and empirical scholarship on the subject; the third 
section describes the model’s variables and methodology; and the last two sections present the model's results and 
offer concluding remarks.    
The Problems of Inequality 
 Visiting America in the early 19th century, Alexis de Tocqueville (2000) remarked that the most striking 
characteristic of the citizens of the new democratic regime was equality of conditions. Equality of conditions, he 
argued, was the generative fact from which all other phenomena flowed. While the state of equality Tocqueville 
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observed has given way to a state of rising inequality, Americans continue to cherish the idea of equality. 
Interestingly, equal conditions or outcomes have been replaced by the idea of equality of opportunity. Yet, equality 
of opportunity is difficult to realize in a market oriented democracy where income disparities preclude equal 
opportunity. The cleavages produced by “our economic system can comprise, hinder, and at times undermine the 
political equalities promised by citizenship” (Yashar 2005: 50). Whereas capitalism thrives on, and produces, 
inequality, democracy is strengthened most when individuals are equal in resources and power (Marshall 1963). In 
the absence of state redistributive policies, extreme economic inequality generally has multiple effects: it arrests the 
political and economic freedoms of country's majority while enhancing those of the elite.  
 In contrast to parts of Europe, the Scandinavian countries for example, where government social spending 
is institutionally well-entrenched, the prevailing societal and political norm in the United States is self-help; 
resorting to public assistance should be a last resort. Ideally, Americans rely on the value of their human capital in 
the market to obtain a wage and produce opportunity for themselves. According to this view, disparities in income 
and opportunity generally reflect individual initiative and effort. Yet, today’s American income gap reveals the 
richest 20% of income earners capture about half the national income while the bottom 80% divides the rest (see 
Table I). From the perspective of much of the American population, claims of “equality of opportunity” and “robust 
economic growth” may seem apocryphal and propagandistic. Domestically, then, the income gap highlights the gap 
between what Americans would like to believe about themselves and what the economic system reveals about the 
country’s priorities. 
Table I. Distribution of National Income by each Quintile, for years 1947-2005
  What the American income gap portends for American politics and international relations is 
important. Economic inequality may lead to economic and political instability as the population becomes 
increasingly fragmented due to internal competition over scarce resources. In Politics, Aristotle (1984) argues a 
critical level of economic equality is necessary for a democracy to protect itself from internal destruction, and that 
stability could not be achieved when the multitude are overly poor. Instability, in turn, adversely affects the country’s 
ability to influence global developments and protect its sovereignty. If we accept the rhetoric of the current chief 
executive, whatever instability is produced by income inequality may only weaken the nation in a time of increasing 
external security threats from both nation-states and non-state actors. 
Immanuel Wallerstein (1999) has argued that regimes of economic inequality ultimately fracture, especially 
when that inequality is based on group identity. Although income inequality consistently has worsened since the late 
1960s, the American situation has not been complicated by racial and ethnic cleavages as in developing countries. 
However, the absence of politicized class identities should not be assumed. Although income inequalities may be 
ameliorated through state redistribution, the government’s competence and willingness to secure regime stability 
through equitable income distribution also must not be assumed. 
YEAR
QUINTILE 1947 1962 1969 1973 1977 1981 1986 1989 1993 1997 2000 2003 2005
 
Lowest 20% 5.0 5.0 5.6 5.5 5.5 5.3 4.7 4.6 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.1 4.0
2nd Lowest 20% 11.9 12.1 12.4 11.9 11.7 11.4 10.9 10.6 9.9 9.9 9.8 9.6 9.6
Middle 20% 17.0 17.6 17.7 17.5 17.6 17.5 16.9 16.5 15.7 15.7 15.5 15.5 15.3
2nd Highest 20% 23.1 24.0 23.7 24.0 24.3 24.6 24.1 23.7 23.3 23.0 22.8 22.2 22.9
Highest 20% 43.0 41.3 40.6 41.1 40.9 41.2 43.4 44.6 47.0 47.2 47.4 47.6 48.1
Top 5% 17.5 15.7 15.6 15.5 14.9 14.4 16.5 17.9 20.3 20.7 20.8 20.5 21.1
(Extracted from top 20%)
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Historical Income Tables—Families (all Races)
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The Related Literature
 
   To asses how economic globalization may affect income distribution this study reviews the 
literature on trade, foreign direct investment, portfolio flows, and immigration. 
International trade
  While the relationship between global economic integration and income inequality has been the 
subject of much controversy recently, the theoretical debates about economic liberalization and income inequality 
abound in the economics literature (Meyer 1999), and to a lesser degree in the political science literature. Many 
scholars have cited the Heckscher-Ohlin equilibrium model of trade (1933), which considers the employment of 
skilled and unskilled workers in two countries and the trade of skill-intensive and labor-intensive goods between 
them (Wood 1994; Caves 1996; Meyer 1999; Kapstein 2000; Mahler 2004). The model has been used to predict 
patterns of trade in finished goods and the resulting impact of this trade on wages (Wood, 1994). The comparative 
advantage the U.S. has in skilled labor and capital relative to developing countries, and the comparative advantage 
developing countries have in unskilled labor, means the U.S. would rely on skilled-labor and capital-intensive 
production for its exports and import labor-intensive products. Cheap imports of unskilled and labor-intensive 
products would then harm the wages of unskilled, low-income workers in the US, and exacerbate income 
inequalities by depressing wages for the bottom quintiles of income earners. According to the model, increased trade 
among nations theoretically could explain much of the increase in inequality seen in the U.S. (Wood 1994; Blau and 
Kahn 1996). 
  According to Williamson (1998: 60), historical analysis supports the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem 
since the increased trade among industrialized nations from 1870 until World War I "led to rising wage/rental ratios 
in Europe, and falling wage/rental ratios in the New World." Consequently, inequality decreased in Europe and 
increased in the U.S. Relatedly, Reuveny and Li (2003) demonstrated increased trade during this era's economic 
liberalization hurt the income structure in developed countries and benefited it in developing nations. Despite these 
findings and the conventional wisdom on trade, which posits a clear and positive relationship between trade and 
income inequality (Reich 1992; Wood 1994; Hurrell and Woods 1995; Tonelson 2000), many scholars have 
produced empirical results that refute these claims and evidence. 
Some studies assert trade has had relatively little effect on the wages of less-skilled workers since the 1980s 
(Borjas, Freeman and Katz 1992; Sachs and Shatz 1994). Others recently have produced results which seem to 
refute the Heckscher-Ohlin model's prediction of inequality in developed nations by empirically demonstrating trade 
does not adversely affect income inequality in developed nations (Mahler 2004; Rudra 2004). While demonstrating 
trade had no effect on wages in highly developed countries, Rudra also showed trade actually worsened inequality in 
developing countries. Clearly, the relationship between trade and income is far from 
settled.   
Similar to the Heckscher-Ohlin model, the Stopler-Samuelson theorem (1941) predicted international trade 
would benefit the owners of abundant factors and reduce the incomes of the owners of scarce factors. Because 
developed nations are relatively well endowed with skilled labor and capital, its imports would hurt the incomes of 
unskilled domestic workers and, therefore, increase inequality in developed countries while decreasing inequality in 
developing countries (Wood 1994). Conversely, the theorem predicts U.S. exports would benefit the owners of 
capital and skilled workers. Relatedly, trade with less developed nations makes it easier for firms in developed 
countries to substitute low-skilled labor with cheap imported products, thereby reducing the ability of domestic labor 
to bargain for higher wages (Rodrik 1997). Although nothing prevents the "winners" of globalization from 
compensating the "losers" to reduce inequality, it is highly unlikely firms will voluntarily do so (Rodrik 1997; 
Salvatore 1998). However, some argue trade increases labor productivity, which then leads to increased wages and 
reduced inequality (Held et al. 1999). This would obviate the need for "winners" to compensate "losers" since, 
eventually, losers become winners through productivity gains. 
Some freely admit international trade has adverse effects on income inequality, but argue such inequality 
incentivizes education and skill attainment, which increases the economic prospects of those hurt by globalization 
(Blanchard 2000). Others dispute the predictive power of the Stopler-Samuelson theorem by claiming the 
assumptions that underlie the model are so "extraordinarily demanding [that it] cannot be taken seriously" (Bhagwati 
and Dehejia 1994: 39). Moreover, some argue trade with less developed nations constitutes so little a share of a 
developed nation's economy that the impact of that trade on income inequality in developed nations is negligible 
(Galbraith 1998; Krugman 1995). 
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Foreign direct investment 
 
Although considered as important as trade, the literature examining the impact of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) and portfolio flows on inequality is not as extensive as the trade literature (Mahler 2004). Generally lacking 
theoretical models of its own, the impact foreign direct investment has on income structures may be predicted 
through the same Heckscher-Ohlin model that many have used for international trade (Mundell 1957; Caves 1996). 
Simply, outbound capital investment hurts domestic workers and increases income disparities as these workers are 
deprived of work they otherwise would have. Inbound investment benefits the incomes of domestic workers for the 
opposite reason. 
FDI arguably exacerbates the income gap in the host country as well. Some argue multinational 
corporations (MNCs) pressure host governments to crack down on labor unions that attempt to negotiate for higher 
wages (Reuveny and Li 2003). The possibility of MNCs leaving the host country also weakens the negotiating 
power of labor unions and depresses wages there (Nafziger 1997; Salvatore 1998). Moreover, MNCs are said to 
offer below market wages for labor-intensive work and push local competing employers to follow suit (Barnet and 
Cavanagh 1994; Held et al. 1999). By contrast, several studies argue MNCs provide host countries with capital and 
technology and push local industries to implement more efficient business practices (Reuveny and Li 2003). It also 
is argued the influence of MNCs on domestic producers improves productivity on all sides, and that this increased 
productivity stimulates economic growth in the host country (Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development 1994; Bolmstrom and Kokko 1996; Barta and Tan 1997). 
  Like trade, the empirical evidence of the impact of FDI on income inequality is conflicting. 
Reuveny and Li (2003) have found the impact of FDI on income inequality to be positive and statistically significant 
for both developed and developing countries, although producing higher levels of inequality in the former than in 
the latter. Mahler (2004) and Moran (1999) have found FDI is not statistically related in any way to income 
inequality. Rudra (2004: 691-692) found empirical evidence indicating "FDI was statistically significant [and 
increases inequality in developed countries], but since it is highly correlated with trade…it was dropped from the 
model to avoid collinearity problems." Echoing Caves (1996: 115), the “consequences of foreign investment [on 
inequality in developed countries] in the long run remain a strictly unsettled issue."       
 
 Portfolio investment
       The effects of portfolio flows on inequality, again, are disputable. Theoretically, and without 
offering empirical evidence, Obstfeld (1998: 19) states it is "implausible" portfolio flows have played a prominent 
role in widening the American income gap since "the United States has been running substantial current account 
deficits since the mid-1970s," thus importing instead of exporting capital. While very little recent empirical analyses 
find the effect of outbound portfolio investment on income distribution to be statistically significant for the U.S. 
(Reuveny and Li 2003; Rudra 2004; Mahler 2004), the variable is included here to account for the impact portfolio 
investments may have on income structures through a more subtle method.  By exporting capital, a country may 
experience a reduction in government social spending as a consequence of a reduction of the tax base (Meyer 1999). 
Moreover, as Mahler (2004: 1048) reports, there is "growing evidence that financial openness works to constrain 
governments' use of macroeconomic tools to stimulate the economy, affecting earnings distribution in the process.” 
Meyer (1999: 112) agrees that a loss in tax revenue as a consequence of portfolio flows may adversely affect wages 
“through a more subtle mechanism, namely a constraint on fiscal policy and thus on social insurance which would 
otherwise serve to ameliorate the distribution in earnings caused by globalization." Rodrik (1997: 53) argues 
increased portfolio flows "result in increased demands on the state to provide social insurance [to offset the 
pernicious effects of globalization] while reducing the ability of the state to perform that role effectively." 
Unfortunately, labor is less able to escape taxation in the same way that firms do, and workers' incomes suffer as the 
middle class and poor pay an increasingly greater percentage of total social spending (Rodrik 1997).
Again, empirical results for international portfolio flows and its relationship to income disparity are as 
divergent as those for international trade and FDI. Reuveny and Li (2003) find outward portfolio flows increase 
income inequality in developed nations, but not in a significant way. These results should be considered with the 
understanding that "the rise in portfolio investment...is a relatively recent phenomenon...and may significantly affect 
income inequality in the future" (Reuveny and Li 2003: 588).  In fact, Mahler (2004: 1040) produces results that 
indicate portfolio flows are significantly and negatively affecting income distribution in countries with few controls 
on capital mobility, which suggests "traditional mechanisms of international economic interaction, trade and 
investment, are less important than exposure to international finance." However, Rudra (2004) found portfolio flows 
had no effect on income earnings in either developed or developing countries. Clearly, the debate on the effects 
portfolio flows have on income inequality is far from settled.    
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Immigration
  Immigration, particularly undocumented, is generally ignored when scholars consider the impact 
that economic globalization has on income distribution. Several obstacles, such as the lack of consistently reliable 
and valid data on undocumented immigration, continue to frustrate social scientists. Consequently, most studies on 
the relationship between international migration and its economic impact on the host country approach the question 
by distinguishing between skilled and unskilled immigration, and not necessarily through the documented/
undocumented immigration lens. Several studies on the skilled/unskilled front help illuminate the relationship 
between increasing international migration and income distribution. Meyer (1998: 113) revealed that from the 1870 
to 1913 time period, "immigration from labor-rich Europe to the land-rich New World reinforced the trends in 
income distribution which has come about due to trade in goods." Mass migration from Europe to the Americas 
increased the supply of America's unskilled labor and depressed wages (Williamson 1998). Although Census data 
routinely undercount the number of immigrants by approximately 10% (Meyer 1999), Meyer (1999:  113) presents 
evidence demonstrating "the presence of immigrant workers in the United States in 1998 increased the labor supply 
of high school drop outs by 25 percent while the labor supply of high school graduates increased by only 6 percent." 
Indeed, most immigrants from developing countries arrive in developed countries with only their human capital, 
which is relatively under-educated and unskilled (Dolmas and Huffman 2004). As unskilled, uneducated 
immigration increases, the wages of unskilled workers fall due to the increasing supply of unskilled labor. 
Whether the decrease in wages for domestic workers is significant can be debated. Some argue the 
empirically demonstrable effect of contemporary international labor migration on wage structures has been 
insignificant and mixed (Borjas 1990, 1993; Ichino 1993; Reuveny and Li 2003). Yet Borjas (1994, 1995, 1999) 
later concludes the benefits of unskilled immigration on a developed country are minimal, and the costs on domestic 
workers can be large. Topel (1994) agrees, and argues immigration reduces wages by 10%, and at lower quintiles of 
income earners this percentage can be higher. Although the literature and empirical data on the impact of 
immigration on income is small comparatively speaking, Dolmas' and Huffman's (2004) experiments with general 
equilibrium models find that when income inequality is high, the rich will support unskilled immigration and the 
poor will resist it. Conversely, when inequality is low, the rich and lower income earners are indifferent to unskilled 
immigration, but the rich will resist highly skilled and capital rich immigrants (Dolmas and Huffman 2004). These 
experimental models, coupled with the wide income gap and high capital exports experienced today in the U.S., 
suggest immigration and economic globalization produce economic hardship either in perception or in fact, or both. 
Clearly, more empirical analysis using the current immigration data is needed. 
Variables
Dependent variable: income distribution
Income Inequality Ratio. Unlike cross-national studies that use data generated by disparate governmental and 
non-governmental organizations, this study, by focusing solely on the US, was able to use one source for its income 
distribution data. U.S. Census Bureau’s income distribution data for families by quintiles was used for the years 
1980 to 2005.  Income inequality is operationalized by creating an inequality ratio between the top 20% and bottom 
20% of income earners for each year. The model’s name for income inequality is IncomeRatio.
Independent variables: economic globalization 
This set of five variables represents economic globalization, comprehensively defined as the flow of goods 
and services, capital, and labor across international borders. Again, the addition of international labor mobility into 
the definition of economic globalization is the novel component of this empirical research. The five independent 
variables and their variable names are: international trade (TRADE), foreign direct investment (FDI), international 
portfolio investment (PORT), authorized immigration (IMG), and undocumented immigration (UNDOC). Data for 
the years 1980 to 2005 are used. Given the effect of international trade, foreign direct investment and portfolio flows 
on an economy depends on the size of country’s economy, TRADE, FDI, and PORT are taken as a percentage of 
U.S. GDP. Similarly, a country’s ability to absorb an influx of foreign labor depends on the size of the total 
population. Therefore, IMG and UNDOC are taken as a share of total U.S. population. If detractors of globalization 
are correct, this set of variables should have a negative impact on income inequality in the U.S.   
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International Trade. TRADE is the sum of U.S. exports and imports as a share of its GDP for each year from 
1980 to 2005. For the years 1980 to 2004, Penn World Tables data, which measures international trade as a 
percentage of GDP and relies on World Bank and United Nations reports, is used. For 2005, the model uses U.S. 
trade data as a share of GDP from the International Monetary Fund’s Financial Statistics 2006 Yearbook. 
 
Foreign Direct Investment. This variable reflects the amount of capital exiting the U.S. in search of profits in 
the long-term. Data for FDI is taken from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNTAD), 
which measures FDI as a percentage of GDP for each year. 
 
International Portfolio Investment. PORT is the sum of portfolio investments abroad as share of GDP for 
each year. PORT is an important measure of an economy’s openness to short-term capital outflows. Like FDI, data 
for PORT are from UNCTAD. 
Authorized Immigration. IMG is the total U.S. authorized population as a percentage of the U.S. population for 
each year. IMG captures the portion of international labor flows recorded by the government. Data for IMG are from 
the U.S. Bureau of Citizenship, the Immigration Services, and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.  
 
Unauthorized Immigration. UNDOC measures the undocumented population as a share of the total US 
population for each year. Although conclusively valid data for this hidden population have not been gathered, and no 
government agency has begun to systematically count the undocumented population (K. Woodrow-Lafield, personal 
communication, July 17, 2007), a “residual method” has been developed to estimate the undocumented population. 
The method subtracts the legal immigrant population, which consists primarily of legal permanent residents and 
naturalized citizens, from the total foreign population and designates the residual as a source for estimating the 
undocumented population (Massey and Bartley 2005; Passel 2006). Data for the residual method are obtained 
primarily from the census and the Current Population Survey’s Annual Social and Economic Supplement, which is 
produced every March. To operationalize unauthorized immigration, this study relies on the Pew Hispanic Center, 
which uses the residual method.
Table II summarizes the model’s dependent and independent variables and their sources.
Table II. Variable Description and Sources
Variable Description Source
IncomeRatio
(dependent)
TRADE
FDI
PORT
IMG
UNDOC
Inequality ratio between the top 20% and bottom 20% of all 
income earners for U.S. families for each year from 1980 to 
2005. 
The sum of U.S. exports and imports of goods and services 
as a share of GDP for each year from 1980 to 2005. 
U.S. long-term capital investment in foreign countries as a 
share of GDP for each year from 1980 to 2005.
U.S. short-term portfolio investment in foreign markets as a 
share of GDP for each year from 1980 to 2005.
Authorized immigration into the U.S. as share of total 
population for each year from 1980 to 2005.
Unauthorized population in the U.S. as share of the total 
population for each year from 1980 to 2005. 
U.S. Census Bureau
Penn World Tables &
International Financial Statistics 
2006 Yearbook 
United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development
United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development
US Bureau of Citizenship and 
Immigration Services & US 
Department of Homeland Security
Pew Hispanic Center
53
Hypotheses
 
  Based on the bodies of work in the areas of trade, capital mobility and immigration, this study 
hypothesizes increases in international trade, capital and labor flows exacerbates income inequality in the United 
States. Specifically, the model disaggregates the general hypothesis into five: 
1) TRADE increases IncomeRatio. 
By relying on its comparative advantage, the US exports capital-intensive products and imports labor-
intensive products. Cheap imports of labor-intensive products harm the wages of unskilled, low-income 
workers in the US, and exacerbate income inequalities by depressing wages for the bottom quintiles of 
income earners (from Heckscher-Ohlin)
2) FDI increases IncomeRatio. 
FDI increases income inequality because it deprives American workers of capital that would otherwise be 
invested domestically, which presumably would generate employment and income (Meyer 1999; Mahler 
2004).
3) PORT has no effect on IncomeRatio. 
Heeding the work of past empirical analyses (Reuveny and Li 2003; Rudra 2004; Mahler, 2004). PORT is 
not expected to increase income inequality.
4) IMG has no effect on IncomeRatio. 
Relative to the entire U.S. population, the size of the authorized immigration population is small. 
Unauthorized immigration, therefore, is not predicted to be statistically significant in explaining income 
distribution.
5) UNDOC increases IncomeRatio. 
As the undocumented population increases, the increasing supply of unskilled labor in the US drives wages 
down in lower-skilled professions. As these kinds of wages fall, income inequality grows.   
 Due to the conflicting results in the trade and capital debate, as well as the limited work on immigration, 
this study has the latitude to predict increasing economic integration widens the income gap in a general way, but 
hypothesizes only TRADE, FDI, and UNDOC will be statistically significant.  
Research Design 
As mentioned previously, this study provides an empirical examination to determine the statistical 
relationship between five independent variables—TRADE, FDI, PORT, IMG, UNDOC—that measure economic 
globalization and our measure of income inequality in the U.S., IncomeRatio. The data form a time-series set 
covering the years 1980 to 2005, and were run through SPSS’s ordinary least squares regression statistical program. 
SPSS allows us to determine the general effect of the model’s variable set for economic globalization on income 
inequality. SPSS also enables us to measure the individual impact of each independent variable on the dependent 
variable when controlling for all other independent variables. 
The equation is as follows:
Y = a + b1 x1 + b2 x2 + b3 x3 + b4 x4 + b5 x5
where: 
Y = IncomeRatio, U.S. income inequality as a percentage of GDP 
a = constant
b1 = TRADE, U.S. international trade as a percentage of GDP 
b2 = FDI, U.S. foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP
b3 = PORT, U.S. portfolio investment as a percentage of GDP
b4 = IMG, Authorized immigration as a share of total U.S. population
b5 = UNDOC, Unauthorized immigration as share of total U.S. population 
Results
 Table III through VI summarize the SPSS results. The adjusted R-squared value of .855 indicates the 
model's R-square value (.885) was penalized 0.03 points for having five independent variables. Therefore, the 
number of independent variables in our model is not excessive. The adjusted R-square value demonstrates the 
model's five economic globalization variables explain at least 85.5 % of the variation in the income inequality 
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variable. The model's F statistic of 29.317 and Sig of .000 support the findings for the R-squared and adjusted R-
square values by reinforcing the ability of the model's independent variables to explain the dependent variable's 
behavior. Looking to t-ratio values for each of the model’s independent variables, Hypothesis 1 is confirmed at t-
ratio of 3.655. Hypothesis 2, however, is rejected as the t-ratio value for FDI is -2.7. International trade increases 
income inequality, while FDI decreases it. As predicted, Hypotheses 3 and 4 are accepted at t-ratios of -0.703 and 
-0.577, respectively. Increased portfolio flows and authorized immigration do not affect income inequality in a 
statistically significant way. Interestingly, Hypothesis 5, which predicts unauthorized immigration increases income 
inequality, is rejected, but its t-ratio value of -1.905 is only 0.095 points from statistical significance. 
 The negative signs on the B and t-ratio values for FDI are interesting because they indicate FDI decreases 
income inequality in a statistically significant way. This finding is at odds with the literature and, as mentioned, 
hypothesis #2. Also, UNDOC has come very close to being statically significant at t-ratio -1.905 and Sig .072. As 
with FDI, the negative sign on UNDOC is at odds with the literature and hypothesis #5. "Wrong signs" suggest the 
possibility that some Error Term Assumptions have not been met. Indeed, the model suffers from multicollinearity.
Table III
Predictors: (Constant), TRADE, FDI, PORT, IMG, UNDOC
Dependent Variable: IncomeRatio
Table IV
 
 
Table V
R R Square
Adjusted R 
Square
Std. Error of the 
Estimate Durbin-Watson
0.941 0.885 0.855 0.47936 1.055
 
Sum of 
Squares Df Mean Square F Sig.
Regression 33.682 5 6.736 29.317 .000(a)
Residual 4.366 19 0.230   
Total 38.048 24    
Unstandardized Coefficients
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig.
 Independent
 Variable B Std. Error Beta   
(Constant) 3.813 1.444  2.641 0.016
 TRADE 0.413 0.113 1.663 3.655 0.002
 FDI -0.000006020 0.000 -0.379 -2.700 0.014
 PORT -0.000010382 0.000 -0.253 -0.703 0.491
 IMG -0.000241956 0.000 -0.060 -0.577 0.571
 UNDOC -0.000000281 0.000 -0.732 -1.905 0.072
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Table VI
Table VI presents the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) values for the independent variables, and Trade, 
PORT, and UNDOC are all above the minimum of 5. Because these three variables are correlated, we are unable to 
definitively asses the individual impact of each variable on income inequality. Running a Correlations analysis 
confirms the Collinearity Statistics as Trade, PORT, and UNDOC are significantly correlated to each other (see 
Appendix).   
 The model also suffers from autocorrelation. The Durbin-Watson value for the regression is outside the safe 
range of 1.5 to 2.5 at 1.055. Because this error inflates t-ratio values and leads to Type I error, we employ Stata 9 
Newey-West standard errors to correct for autocorrelation. If we correct for autocorrelation, the original SPSS t-
values for TRADE and FDI increase in significance. Table IV presents the Stata results for TRADE and FDI, which 
are 4.99 and -3.68, respectively. Interestingly, the model’s UNDOC variable becomes statistically significant at        
-2.72 when corrected for autocorrelation. Again, the signs on our FDI and UNDOC are at odds with the literature 
and hypotheses #2 and #5. 
Table VII
IncomeRatio
(dependent variable)
STATA 9
t-ratio
SPSS
t-ratio
TRADE 4.99 3.655
FDI -3.68 -2.700
UNDOC -2.72 -1.905
 
 Where multicollinearity is present, one would expect to see an exceptionally high R-square and no, or few, 
statistically significant variables. Therefore, the presence of both multicollinearity and statistically significant 
variables suggest the predictive power of TRADE, FDI, and UNDOC in explaining the behavior of IncomeRatio are 
so strong that these variables are able to overcome the circumscribing influence of multicollinearity. However, 
multicollinearity does prevent us from assessing the direction and magnitude of the relationship between TRADE, 
FDI, and UNDOC and IncomeRatio with certainty. 
Conclusion 
  Does economic globalization increase income inequality in the United States? In an attempt to 
answer the question with greater accuracy than previous studies, this empirical examination offers a more 
comprehensive definition of "economic globalization." By operationalizing two distinct variables for international 
labor mobility, as well as the customary three variables for trade and capital flows, this unique model is better 
equipped to discover a relationship between globalization and inequality because its conceptualization of economic 
Collinearity Statistics
Tolerance VIF
  
0.029 34.299
0.307 3.257
0.047 21.481
0.550 1.817
0.041 24.448
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globalization includes an essential but previously neglected factor of production. I find economic globalization does 
not increase income inequality in the U.S. in a systematic way. Out of five independent variables, three—TRADE, 
FDI, and UNDOC—affect income inequality in statically significant ways, but the results are mixed. International 
trade increases income inequality, while foreign direct investment and unauthorized immigration decrease inequality. 
  Ideally, the model's methodology allows us to disaggregate the general relationship between 
economic globalization and income inequality to assess the individual impact of each independent variable on the 
dependent variable, but the presence of multicollinearity prevents us from doing this definitively. This 
methodological limitation notwithstanding, the ability of the model's three statistically significant variables to 
overcome the potentially crippling effect multicollinearity has on them indicates these variables are truly significant 
in explaining income inequality. The question is whether these three variables impact the dependent variable in the 
directions revealed by the regression results. The opposite impacts international trade and FDI have on income 
inequality can be reconciled with previous empirical analyses, but determining the impact of undocumented 
immigration is problematic because the unexpected results can not be understood by reflecting on previous empirical 
analyses since little work has been done in this area. Therefore, a truly valid empirical assessment of the impact 
undocumented immigration has on income inequality in the United States escapes this study due to both 
measurement and methodological constraints.    
 To resolve the problem, I suggest two courses of action. First, an advanced research design is needed to 
overcome this model's methodological limitation. Although multicollinearity between international trade and FDI is 
a serious constraint that has affected other studies the limitation can be remedied through a variety of different 
approaches. Rudra (2004), for example, chose to drop FDI from her model because it was correlated to trade. A 
similar approach can be applied to international migration. Empirically examining the relationship between 
economic globalization, comprehensively defined beyond traditional neoliberal variables, required a full 
presentation of the regression results. Because the principal objective of this study is to expand the debate on 
economic globalization and income inequality into a nascent area of demographic change, superior methodological 
approaches are left to future research.                             
  In addition to an improved methodology, this study highlights the need for government agencies 
and demographers to develop procedures that consistently and validly estimate the unauthorized population in the 
U.S. The indirect estimates used today will not suffice in an environment of increasing economic inequality and 
increasing external security threats, whether these threats are real or perceived. While the perceived significance of 
unauthorized immigration has waxed and waned throughout history, the issue's salience in a post 9/11 world requires 
informed debate based on valid and reliable data. Moreover, even if and when security fears recede, economic 
concerns threaten to re-politicize international labor flows. Therefore, it is in the short-term and long-term interests 
of social scientists and policy makers to have access to valid estimates of the unauthorized population in the U.S. 
Until valid and reliable measures of the unauthorized population are produced, we should attempt to improve the 
residual method. 
 While there have been numerous empirical studies examining the impact of global neoliberal economics on 
income inequality in America, surprisingly few have examined the combined impact of liberal economic processes 
and immigration on income. By examining the impacts the three major modes of neoliberal economic integration 
and international labor mobility have on income inequality in the U.S., this study improves our understanding of the 
relationship between economic globalization and income structures while responding to the claim that America 
benefits from globalization. In terms of the three major modes of neoliberal integration, the study produces 
conflicting results. The novel contribution, however, lies in the definition of economic globalization and the 
operationalization of undocumented immigration. Interestingly, the regression results find this population decreases 
income inequality. Despite its methodological limitation, this unique model largely achieves its objective by 
including international labor flows as a factor of production in the study of American income inequality.       
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Appendix
Correlations
 IncomeRatio Trade Portfolio Legal Imgt # Undoc Res # FDI
IncomeRatio Pearson Correlation 1 .830(**) -.890(**) .642(**) .876(**) .659(**)
 Sig. (2-tailed)  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
 N 59 55 26 56 26 36
Trade Pearson Correlation .830(**) 1 -.962(**) .732(**) .964(**) .785(**)
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
 N 55 55 25 55 25 35
Portfolio Pearson Correlation -.890(**) -.962(**) 1 -.407(*) -.958(**) -.590(**)
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000  0.039 0.000 0.002
 N 26 25 26 26 26 26
Legal Imgt # Pearson Correlation .642(**) .732(**) -.407(*) 1 0.262 0.279
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.039  0.196 0.099
 N 56 55 26 56 26 36
Undoc Res # Pearson Correlation .876(**) .964(**) -.958(**) 0.262 1 .566(**)
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.196  0.003
 N 26 25 26 26 26 26
FDI Pearson Correlation .659(**) .785(**) -.590(**) 0.279 .566(**) 1
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.099 0.003  
 N 36 35 26 36 26 36
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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